








Solving the climate change problem by limiting global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions will necessitate action by the world’s two largest emitters, the United 
States and China.  Neither has so far committed to quantitative emissions limits.  
Some argue that China cannot be engaged on the basis of its national interest 
in climate policy, on the ground that China’s national net benefits of limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions would be negative, as a result of significant GHG abate-
ment costs and potential net gains to China from a warmer world.  This premise 
has led some observers to advocate other approaches to engaging China, such as 
appeal to moral obligation. 
This Article argues that appeal to national net benefits is still the best 
approach to engage China.  First, appealing to China’s asserted moral obligation 
to limit its GHG emissions may be ineffective or even counterproductive.  Even 
if climate change is a moral issue for American leaders, framing the issue that 
way may not be persuasive to Chinese leaders.  Second, the concern that China’s 
national net benefits of climate policy are negative is based on older forecasts of 
costs and benefits.  More recent climate science, of which the Chinese leadership 
is aware, indicates higher damages to China from climate change and thus greater 
net benefits to China from climate policy.  Third, the public health co-benefits of 
reducing other air pollutants along with GHGs may make GHG emissions limits 
look more attractive to China.  Fourth, the distribution of climate impacts within 
China may be as important as the net aggregate: climate change may exacerbate 
political and social stresses within China, which the leadership may seek to avoid 
in order to maintain political stability.  Fifth, the costs of abatement may decline as 
innovation in China accelerates.  Sixth, as China becomes a great power in world 
politics, and as climate change affects China’s allies, leadership on climate policy 
may look more favorable to China’s elites.  Seventh, the design of the international 
climate treaty regime itself can offer positive incentives to China. 
Taken together, these factors point to a potential and even ongoing shift in 
Chinese climate policy.  They illustrate how the international law and politics of 
climate change depend on domestic politics and institutions.  And they suggest that 
the United States, if it too takes effective action, can make the case for enlightened 
pragmatism as a basis to engage China in a cooperative global climate policy regime. 
                                                                                                                            
 * Perkins Professor of Law and Professor of Environmental Policy & Public Policy Studies, Duke 
University; University Fellow, Resources for the Future.  I thank Xin Dai and Zheng Zhou for research 
assistance, as well as Jonathan Ocko, Jedediah Purdy, and Ji Zou for valuable discussion and comments. 




I. GLOBAL EMISSIONS AND CHINA...............................................................................1807 
II. TYPES OF STRATEGIES TO PERSUADE CHINA ............................................................1810 
III. CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSUASION: APPEALS TO NORMS AND MORALS ......................1812 
IV. REALIST PERSUASION: DOMESTIC INTERESTS 




To solve the climate change problem, the United States must act, and 
it must engage China.1  But can it, and if so, how?  The challenge is great, 
and too important not to tackle.  Indeed, we need to address it promptly.  
The year 2009 may be pivotal for climate change policy.  In January 
2009, the next U.S. president will take office and face this question.  Climate 
legislation will be pending in the Congress.  And the Bali Action Plan2 calls 
for negotiations on a new treaty to succeed the Kyoto Protocol, to be 
completed by the end of 2009.3 
Some have argued that engaging China cannot be premised on its 
national interest in climate policy (on the ground that limiting greenhouse 
gas emissions would be harmful to China’s national interests), and that 
therefore other approaches, such as appeal to moral obligation, should be 
employed to engage China.4  This Article argues that an appeal to national 
net benefits is still the best approach to engage China.  Part I sets out the 
context of rapidly rising greenhouse gas emissions in China, and the problem 
                                                                                                                            
 1. The U.S. and China are the world’s two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, and China’s 
emissions are growing rapidly.  See infra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.  But neither has yet com-
mitted to quantitative limits on its emissions. 
 2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the 
Parties, Thirteenth Session, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Decision 1/CP.13: Bali Action Plan, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/ 
cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3 [hereinafter Bali Action Plan]. 
 3. See id. at 5. 
 4. See Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?  The Complex Climate 
Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675 (2008) (describing 
China’s potentially negative national net benefits of limiting emissions, and suggesting that we 
appeal to China to recognize and act upon its moral obligation to combat climate change); see also 
Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555 (2004) (advocating a cultural transformation toward an environmental ethic 
or moral code as the way to combat climate change, rather than calculating the net benefits of 
climate policies).  More generally, some have characterized climate change as a moral issue, without 
necessarily advocating this as a strategy to engage China.  See Gore Shares Nobel Peace Prize With 
UN Panel, CNN.com, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/10/12/nobel.gore 
(quoting Al Gore, “the climate crisis is not a political issue it is a moral and spiritual challenge”). 
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that limits adopted in only some countries may induce shifts or “leakage” of 
emissions to other unregulated countries.  Part II very briefly describes the 
types of strategies available to persuade countries to join international 
cooperative efforts.  Part III appraises the weak efficacy of moral obligation as 
a means to persuade China to limit its emissions.  Part IV argues that realist 
incentives are a more effective means to this end.  China’s domestic interests 
are shifting to favor limits on its emissions, based in part on more recent 
climate science, in part on the public health co-benefits to China of reducing 
emissions, and in part on political and social changes occurring in China, and 
China’s leaders’ concerns about political instability potentially exacerbated 
by climate change.  Further, as China becomes a great power in geopolitics, 
while struggling with significant internal tensions, the net benefits of climate 
policy action may look more favorable to China’s leadership.  And the design 
of the international policy regime itself can offer positive incentives to China. 
I. GLOBAL EMISSIONS AND CHINA 
The collective action problem vexing climate policy is by now famil-
iar.5  Because greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide [CO2], methane 
[CH4], and several others) mix globally in the atmosphere and their accu-
mulation has global effects on the Earth’s climate, efforts to abate emis-
sions by any one country impose local costs today while yielding globally 
shared benefits in the future.  Each country therefore faces incentives to 
free ride—to let others bear the costs of limiting emissions while enjoying 
the global benefit.  Some collective approach is thus needed to engage 
cooperative action.  Yet, international treaties are binding only on those coun-
tries that consent to be bound.  With no global sovereign to adopt coercive 
regulation, countries must be affirmatively attracted to join an international 
cooperation regime.6  Countries join treaties where joining yields net national 
benefits over not joining.7 
Any effective strategy to forestall global climate change through 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions limitations will require action by the 
                                                                                                                            
 5. For an overview and analysis, see RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, 
RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO (2003), available at http://www.aei.org/books/ 
docLib/20040218_book211.pdf. 
 6. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal 
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999). 
 7. See LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD (2000) (explaining the need for national net 
benefits to join a treaty, as compared to not joining); cf. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 
Power and Interdependence in the Information Age, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1998, at 81 (arguing that 
states remain the key centers of power, and that national leaders care about national interests). 
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major emitting countries, including both the United States and China, the 
world’s two leading GHG emitters.8  Though the United States had long 
been the top emitter, China’s emissions have been growing rapidly.  Ten years 
ago, around the time of the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, China and 
other developing countries were predicted to surpass the United States 
and other industrialized countries in CO2 emissions by about 2030.
9  But 
China’s actual growth exceeded forecasts.  By 2006 these projections were 
amended: China was expected to surpass the United States in CO2 emissions 
by 2009.10  And just a few months later, in early 2007, the timing was 
advanced to 2007 itself.11  China’s addition to its energy generating capac-
ity each year (90 percent of which is coal combustion) now exceeds the 
total energy capacity of France.12  China’s and other developing countries’ 
GHG emissions are growing so fast that they will push global atmos-
pheric GHG concentrations beyond 450 parts per million (ppm) by the year 
2070 (up from a level of 275 ppm about two centuries ago, and 380 ppm 
nowadays), even if all emissions from industrialized countries such as the United 
States and Europe were reduced to zero today.13 
There is another reason that we need to engage China: the phenome-
non of international emissions leakage.  Emissions limits adopted by the 
United States alone (or in concert with Europe, that is, by the industrialized 
countries alone) would not only omit China’s rapidly growing emissions, as 
described above.  Worse, in a dynamic globalized world economy, such 
partial regulatory coverage could induce transnational emissions leakage as 
sources relocate from regulated to unregulated places.  This effect can offset 
                                                                                                                            
 8. For emissions data and projections, see INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 
2007 (2007).  The next edition will be published in November 2008. 
 9. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS (CEA), ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 171 
(1998), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy99/pdf/erp.pdf. 
 10. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2006, at 41 (2006), available at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/weo2006.pdf. 
 11. See China to Top USA in Greenhouse Emissions, USA TODAY.COM, Apr. 24, 2007, available 
at http://www.usatoday.com/weather/climate/globalwarming/2007-04-24-china-emissions_N.htm 
(citing comments by IEA chief economist, Fatih Birol).  India will soon be third.  See INT’L ENERGY 
AGENCY, supra note 8, at 11.  The present Article focuses on China, but it is clear that more attention to 
engaging India is also needed. 
 12. See A Large Black Cloud: Rapid Growth Is Exacting a Heavy Environmental Price, in 
ECONOMIST, Special Report: China’s Quest for Resources, Mar. 15, 2008, at 17, 17, 21, available at 
http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10795813. 
 13. See Richard G. Richels, Thomas Rutherford, Geoffrey Blanford & Leon Clarke, Managing 
the Transition to Climate Stabilization (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working 
Paper No. 07-01, 2007), available at http://www.reg-markets.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1350 
(noting that if industrialized countries continue emitting unabated, the 450 parts per million (ppm) 
level will be reached earlier, by 2040); see also Andrew C. Revkin, As China Goes, So Goes Global 
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, Week in Review, at 3 (illustrating this forecast with a large chart). 
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the abatement in the regulated countries.  It could even yield greater net 
global emissions than without such action, if the economic activities that 
relocate turn out to emit more GHGs per unit of economic output than they 
did in the regulated country.14  There is some evidence that such leakage has 
contributed to China’s faster-than-expected emissions growth in the last 
five years, and at least in some cases has led to greater emissions increases in 
China than the emissions reductions obtained in Europe.15 
Moreover, the fear of leakage, with its adverse effects on international 
competitiveness and local jobs, can sap the political will to shoulder the 
burden of being the first-mover country and imposing emissions limits.  This 
phenomenon played a role in the U.S. Senate’s rejection of the Kyoto 
Protocol.  It makes the U.S. Congress unlikely to act without at least some 
corresponding action by China.  Over time, leakage will also render the 
economy of the second-mover country (the recipient of the leaking industry) 
even more carbon intensive, as high-emitting industry relocates there, and 
thus will make that country even more reluctant to act than it had been 
initially (as its abatement costs rise).16 
The argument here is not that it would be unfair for the United States 
to have to limit its emissions if China did not have to do likewise, but that 
doing so would be ineffective in protecting the climate, because China’s 
emissions would continue and even accelerate.  Thus, cooperation among 
                                                                                                                            
 14. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967–75 (2007) (summarizing the literature on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
leakage); Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon Leakage, 65 J. 
INT’L ECON. 421 (2005) (finding that in a multiregional computable general equilibrium model, GHG 
emissions limits by OECD member countries alone could yield significant relocation of energy-
intensive industries to other unregulated countries, with leakage rates as high as 130 percent, meaning 
that GHG control policies adopted solely in the industrialized countries could actually result in higher 
global emissions). 
 15. See Joseph Kahn & Mark Landler, China Grabs West’s Smoke-Spewing Factories, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at A1 (“Germany is China’s mirror image.  Polluting factories have 
migrated abroad. . . . Since 1990, Germany has reduced its annual carbon emissions by 19 percent.”); 
id. (“[But] the same hulking blast furnace [was] dismantled and shipped piece by piece from 
Germany’s old industrial heartland to Hebei Province, China’s new Ruhr Valley.  The transfer, one 
of dozens since the late 1990s, contributed to a burst in China’s steel production, which now exceeds 
that of Germany, Japan and the United States combined . . . .”); id. (“China’s less efficient steel 
mills, and its greater reliance on coal, meant that it emitted three times as much carbon dioxide per 
ton of steel as German steel producers.” (emphasis added)). 
 16. See Richard Schmalensee, Greenhouse Policy Architectures and Institutions, in ECONOMICS 
AND POLICY ISSUES IN CLIMATE CHANGE 137, 146 (William D. Nordhaus ed., 1998). 
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the United States, China, and other major emitters is essential if global 
GHG emissions are to be addressed effectively.17 
Yet, it may be difficult to persuade China (and the United States) to 
act.  Abatement is costly, yielding the free rider incentive noted above.  China 
and other developing countries may also understandably perceive unfair-
ness in a demand to limit their emissions when richer countries have not 
adopted similar limitations on their own emissions.  And, even though 
GHGs mix globally and produce global effects, the specific local impacts will 
vary among countries.  The impacts of climate change in any particular 
country depend on such factors as latitude, regional precipitation, wind 
patterns, mix of economic activities, and coastal vulnerability to rising sea 
levels.18  Consequently, even if preventing significant climate change would 
reap positive global net benefits, joining a treaty to limit emissions may 
confront some major emitting countries with high national costs of abate-
ment and low national benefits—that is, negative national net benefits.  The 
United States may be in or near this category, at least if the policy under 
consideration is very costly (lacking the flexibility of market-based incen-
tives such as trading and banking) and if other major emitters do not 
cooperate.  Further, some suggest that China, in addition to perceiving that 
GHG abatement costs exceed benefits, may perceive global warming as 
actually benefiting China in the aggregate, on the view that warming 
would improve agricultural output in northern China.19  If so, China would 
face incentives not just to free ride on others’ abatement, but to actively 
impede others’ abatement. 
II. TYPES OF STRATEGIES TO PERSUADE CHINA 
Thus, the challenge is to achieve the global public good of climate 
protection—averting a tragedy of the global commons—through consensual 
action by heterogeneous national actors.  Cooperation must be secured from 
actors who are major GHG emissions sources, but they may not all perceive 
national net benefits from joining such a cooperative regime.  Or, put more 
                                                                                                                            
 17. An additional advantage of broader global coverage is that it widens a market in 
emissions allowance trading to encompass more abatement opportunities, thus reducing the total 
costs, and diminishing the market power of each seller and buyer. 
 18. See NEIL ADGER ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY 
FOR POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 7–22 
(2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf. 
 19. See WILLIAM NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD (2000), noted in 
Sunstein, supra note 4; STEWART & WIENER, supra note 5, at 23–24, 99–109. 
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directly, how can the United States act and engage China on climate change, 
as on a host of other major issues of the coming century? 
As with many other social problems, there are at least two basic 
approaches one might take to influence behavior: accept people as they are 
and try to change the incentives and institutions that guide their behavior; 
or try to change the people, their preferences, values, and internal norms, 
so that they think differently and thus behave differently.  That is, one can 
design incentives or inculcate ethics (or both); change the rules or change 
the players. 
In international relations theory, as strategies to persuade national govern-
ments to act, these two approaches are termed “realism” with “thin persuasion” 
through incentives, information, and bargaining; and “constructivism” with 
“thick persuasion” through changing deeper preferences, norms, and iden-
tities.20  These two approaches correspond to engaging China through 
incentives (the realist strategy) or through appeals to moral obligation (the 
constructivist strategy).   
Realist persuasion can include appeals to subnational institutions and 
interest groups.  The state is not a monolith,21 and domestic politics affect 
international relations.22  Indeed, as I discuss below, successful international 
strategies to engage China (or any country) often must look beyond national 
aggregate net benefits to find receptive domestic institutions and key 
elements of the domestic distribution of interests.  Among these, moral obli-
gation may or may not be relevant to interests.  The question is it’s the 
relative efficacy of different strategies of persuasion. 
                                                                                                                            
 20. See Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane & Stephen D. Krasner, International Organization 
and the Study of World Politics, in EXPLORATION AND CONTESTATION IN THE STUDY OF WORLD 
POLITICS 5 (Peter J. Katzenstein et al. eds., 1999) (contrasting the two types of approaches and 
urging the need for both); id. at 42 (“Neither project can be complete without the other.”).  Cf. 
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749 
(2003) (describing the acculturation of norms across countries); Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization 
Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975 (2005) (commenting on Goodman and Jinks). 
 21. On disaggregating the state, see Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental 
Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39 (1974); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real 
New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183.  
 22. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, in 
DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 431 (Peter 
B. Evans et al. eds., 1993); Kal Raustiala, Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory Cooperation, 
49 WORLD POL. 482 (1997). 
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III. CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSUASION: APPEALS TO NORMS 
AND MORALS 
A constructivist strategy to shape appropriate norms and instill a sense 
of moral obligation about protecting the global climate23 may accomplish 
some results over time, especially in open societies where public norms 
readily influence government choices.  But it faces several hurdles.  It is 
valuable to aspire to global progress, and I share the spirit of can-do idealism.  
But we must be careful what we mean and say about moral obligation in the 
context of global climate policy, and avoid prescribing a kind of ortho-
doxy of morals that might do little, or even prove counterproductive, in 
persuading China to act. 
First, climate policy is so economically dramatic (in terms of both 
benefits and costs) that it seems unlikely that national leaders would commit 
based on an appeal to moral obligation unrelated to or insensitive to national 
interest and international competitiveness.24 
Second, awareness of moral pluralism counsels caution.  Interpreting 
moral and cultural meanings across societies is not easy.  Even if norms and 
moral duty could be transformed in the United States, China may have 
fundamentally different norms and moral understandings.  If this is so, then a 
successful appeal to the Unites States’ sense of moral obligation is unlikely 
to resonate in China.  It is difficult enough to make moral obligation a 
persuasive basis for climate policy within the United States; it seems even 
harder to convince China of the same.  Nor is a deep consensus on the 
underlying moral basis for action really necessary.  A better approach in this 
setting would be an “incompletely theorized agreement”25 to act on GHG 
                                                                                                                            
 23. See Kysar, supra note 4; Sunstein, supra note 4.  Sunstein’s appeal to moral obligation is 
distinct from Kysar’s call for “cultural transformation,” but both share the strategy of changing 
people’s internal norms and beliefs (rather than external incentives) to spur a change in behavior.  
Sunstein does discuss a variety of strategies to engage China, including incentives in an international 
treaty, but he emphasizes the appeal to moral obligation as a way to persuade China if incentives-
based strategies are inadequate to the task.  It is plausible that domestically, within the U.S., appeals 
to moral obligation regarding climate may be effective in persuading religious conservatives to ally 
with environmentalist liberals.  The issue I address here is whether such a strategy will succeed inter-
nationally to engage China. 
 24. China’s GHG emissions have been driven by its surging economic growth.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 8–13.  China’s leaders may see their political stability as dependent on continued 
economic growth.  See Daniel Abebe & Jonathan Masur, The Two China Problem (Apr. 29, 2008)  
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126966. 
 25. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law (Univ. of 
Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 322, Pub. Law and Legal Theory, 
Working Paper No. 147, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=957369. 
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emissions, via changed policies and incentives, without necessarily agree-
ing on the underlying moral basis. 
Given the potential differences in norms, an appeal to moral obligation 
regarding GHG emissions limits could even backfire, if it were seen in China 
as patronizing and ecoimperialist.  This kind of defiant nationalism sparked 
by foreign moralism is evident in the current controversy over the Olympic 
torch in Tibet.26  It could also trigger a revival of the Maoist view that the 
human will can triumph over nature and that environmentalism is a Western 
plot to suppress China’s development.27  This scenario would only delay 
effective global climate policy. 
Third, the line between moral duty and moralizing is slender, and 
crossing that line may be easy yet counterproductive.  Moral suasion in 
environmental law has often led, at least in the past, to absolutist approaches 
that neglect pragmatic incentives and trade-offs, and accomplish little at 
high cost.  The moralizing of the early modern environmentalist movement 
advanced the notions that pollution is a sin to be expiated by draconian 
government edict, and that markets are the problem not the solution.  That 
view is now progressively being replaced by reliance on economic incentive 
instruments to internalize harms, reconstitute markets, and achieve more 
environmental protection at less cost.  For climate policy, these cost savings 
are highly significant; it is roughly on the order of 90 percent less costly to 
use emissions trading and a comprehensive approach than to adopt narrow 
inflexible policies.28  Going back to the old moral case and its associated rigid 
policy tools would entail such high costs that governments would be far less 
likely to adopt climate policies.  As Harvard’s cognitive scientist Steven 
Pinker put the point recently: 
[N]owhere is moralization more of a hazard than in our greatest global 
challenge.  The threat of human-induced climate change has become 
the occasion for a moralistic revival meeting.  In many discussions, the 
cause of climate change is overindulgence (too many S.U.V.’s) and 
defilement (sullying the atmosphere), and the solution is temperance 
                                                                                                                            
 26. See Matthew Forney, Op-Ed., China’s Loyal Youth, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2008, at 16, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/opinion/13forney.html. 
 27. See JUDITH SHAPIRO, MAO’S WAR AGAINST NATURE: POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA (2001). 
 28. See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 5, at 63–68.  The 90 percent cost saving figure 
compares a comprehensive multi-gas (all GHGs), multi-sector emissions trading policy to an energy 
sector-only CO2-only, no-trading policy with performance standards.  A prescriptive technology-based 
policy of the kind often associated with moralizing about pollution would be even more costly than 
the latter narrow no-trading policy, because it lacks even the “how to” flexibility of a performance 
standard.  Id. 
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(conservation) and expiation (buying carbon offset coupons).  Yet the 
experts agree that these numbers don’t add up: even if every last 
American became conscientious about his or her carbon emissions, the 
effects on climate change would be trifling, if for no other reason than 
that two billion Indians and Chinese are unlikely to copy our born-
again abstemiousness.  Though voluntary conservation may be one 
wedge in an effective carbon-reduction pie, the other wedges will have 
to be morally boring, like a carbon tax and new energy technologies, or 
even taboo, like nuclear power and deliberate manipulation of the ocean 
and atmosphere.  Our habit of moralizing problems, merging them 
with intuitions of purity and contamination, and resting content when 
we feel the right feelings, can get in the way of doing the right thing.29 
Perhaps a moral objective of planetary stewardship can now, in 2008, be 
paired with the more cost-effective policy tools of the post-moralist era.  This 
pairing would be progress.  It would, in effect, shift the moral claim to a 
consequentialist case for the planetary protection goal. 
Fourth, some (liberals) may worry that moral and cultural change are 
too slow.  Even if ultimately effective, changing moral norms among millions 
of people is likely to take far too long to be relevant to forestalling climate 
change.  Those seeking urgent climate protection policy should therefore 
favor the more immediate effects of changing incentives.  Decisions about 
long-term investments in energy generation, such as coal versus nuclear, are 
being made now.  These decisions will shape GHG emissions for decades to 
come.  Changing incentives now can affect those choices; inculcating a mass 
cultural transformation over several decades or centuries may not.30  The last 
three decades—from Mao to Deng to Jiang to Hu—show that the Chinese 
economy can respond rapidly—even in transformative ways at astonishing 
speed—in response to changes in rules and incentives.  (At the same time, 
as I discuss below, environmental protest movements in China today, driven 
in part by extreme weather events and pollution crises, may also motivate 
China’s leaders to act.) 
                                                                                                                            
 29. Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 13, 2008, at 32, 58, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html. 
 30. The transition in Europe and the United States from a dominion mindset to modern environ-
mentalism took decades if not centuries, and the clash of worldviews remains contested even today.  
See generally CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTION (1989); KEITH THOMAS, MAN AND THE NATURAL WORLD: CHANGING ATTITUDES 
IN ENGLAND, 1500–1800 (Oxford University Press 1996); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New 
Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325 (1995).  For a more hopeful 
view that politics are highly dynamic and that climate change policy may respond to changes in 
moral understandings, see Jedediah Purdy, Climate Change and the Limits of the Possible, 18 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. (forthcoming 2008). 
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Fifth, some (conservatives) may worry that cultural change could come 
too quickly.  Rapid change arising from an appeal to cultural transformation 
might not be as desirable as its proponents envision.  China’s “cultural 
revolution” and its “great leap forward,” driven by appeals to moral and 
ideological orthodoxy, are not inspiring precedents, to say the least.  The real 
advance in recent Chinese development has come from liberal economic 
policies, not moral suasion. 
At the same time, there may be common ground.  If an appeal to moral 
obligation means an appeal to an enlightened consequentialist view of the 
merits of improving global and national well-being, that may be persuasive 
to national governments and key domestic constituencies.31  In that sense, 
a modern moral appeal could be part of smart institutional design.  For 
example, national leaders must consider their international reputations; moral 
opprobrium and shaming sanctions could be useful in nudging countries to 
act.32  And if the mass culture in China shifts to protest pollution (as dis-
cussed below), in effect raising the social damages that China’s leaders could 
anticipate from future environmental incidents, then this cultural response 
(or the leaders’ fear of it) would inform the calculus of national interest. 
But these measures use information and incentives to change behav-
ior, emblematic of realist persuasion, and are not rooted in the moral 
transformation of constructivist persuasion.  Perhaps these approaches are 
mutually supportive and both can be undertaken, but we should at least 
recognize that in the international political arena, the overtly moral 
approach poses risks and delays.  So, “suasion,” yes, but not necessarily 
                                                                                                                            
 31. Thomas Jefferson argued, “We are firmly convinced, and we act on that conviction, that 
with nations, as with individuals, our interests soundly calculated, will ever be found inseparable from 
our moral duties . . . .”  Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805).  But it is unclear 
whether Jefferson meant that moral duty is consequentialist, defined by national “interests soundly 
calculated”; or whether he meant that a truly enlightened “sound calculation” of interest would 
aspire to a “moral duty” derived from other axioms; or whether instead he meant something different 
by “inseparable,” as in connected but not identical. 
 32. See A. CHAYES & A. CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); William P. Alford & Benjamin L. Liebman, 
Clean Air, Clean Processes?  The Struggle Over Air Pollution Law in the People’s Republic of China, 52 
HASTINGS L.J. 703, 714–15 (2001) (noting that “at least some in the [Environment and Natural 
Resources Protection Committee] and [National Environmental Policy Agency] argued that China’s 
growing engagement with the international community in the years following the original air 
pollution law’s development [in 1987] provided further rationale for its revision[,]” and that “Beijing’s 
[growing] role in . . . international environmental fora suggested that there would be costs in terms 
of reputational capital to pay for a laggard air quality regime”).  China’s leaders’ concerns about 
the image of pollution at the 2008 Olympics in Beijing crystallize this point.  See Jim Yardley, 
Beijing’s Olympic Quest: Turn Smoggy Skies Blue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2007, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/29/world/asia/29china/html. 
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explicitly labeled “moral.”  Thus, we should continue to attempt realist 
persuasion through changed incentives. 
IV. REALIST PERSUASION: DOMESTIC INTERESTS 
AND INTERNATIONAL INCENTIVES 
Engaging China and the United States in effective action on climate 
change through realist persuasion—appeal to global and national interests, 
and global and national net benefits—can be a successful strategy.  As noted 
above, China’s recent history shows its rapid responsiveness to economic 
incentives.  The net benefits calculus for China’s climate policy is no longer 
as negative as has often been supposed.  In this section, I offer some obser-
vations on the domestic and international incentives that may motivate 
China’s leaders to act on climate change.  China’s perceived benefits of 
climate policy appear to be rising and its perceived costs appear to be fal-
ling.  Even on a purely domestic basis, there are important incentives for 
China to act to reduce emissions: domestic climate change impacts, domes-
tic co-benefits in reduction of other pollutants, energy independence, and 
national security.  As I detail below, China’s leaders are increasingly 
perceiving these impacts as serious, especially in terms of internal societal 
tensions from wealth disparities, rural to urban migration, air and water 
pollution, and potential political upheavals.  Meanwhile, the costs of 
GHG emissions abatement in China may be declining as technological change 
advances.  Further, China’s national net benefits are influenced by events 
occurring outside its borders, such as damages to its allies and trade part-
ners.  As China grows to become a global power, the weight of these impacts 
in China’s deliberations will increase.  Moreover, law can shape payoffs: 
the design of the international policy regime can create incentives for parties 
to cooperate. 
First, the aggregate impacts of climate change on China are now looking 
less favorable.  In the 1990s, studies of the impacts of global climate change 
on China found that the aggregate impacts could be benign.33  These studies 
could well have influenced the Chinese government’s perception of the 
payoffs from a climate treaty regime and militated against joining.  But more 
recent studies, some conducted by Chinese experts, have started to show 
more negative impacts from climate change in China, including drought 
                                                                                                                            
 33. See sources cited supra note 19; Richard S.J. Tol, Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate 
Change: Part I: Benchmark Estimates, 21 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 47 (2002); Richard S.J. Tol, 
Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change: Part II: Dynamic Estimates, 21 ENVTL. & RESOURCE 
ECON. 135 (2002). 
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in northern China, flooding along southern rivers as glaciers melt, and sea 
level rise along the coast.34  Studies conducted by Chinese experts may be 
more influential with, or at least more accessible to, Chinese leaders.35 
Second, climate policy could yield co-benefits in control of local pollu-
tion.  Conventional pollution in China has become severe, killing perhaps 
400,000 to 750,000 people per year and costing about 6 percent of Chinese 
GDP.36  By reducing emissions of sulfur, nitrogen and particulate matter 
pollution (SOx, NOx, and PM) as well, climate policy to reduce GHG 
emissions could simultaneously deliver important improvements in public 
health.37  The Chinese leadership has put a high priority on reducing 
pollution, under the rubric of Hu Jintao’s official principles of “harmonious 
society” and the “scientific concept of development.”38  China is especially 
                                                                                                                            
 34. See ERDA LIN & JI ZOU, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND ITS ECONOMICS IN CHINA 
(2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/8/1/stern_review_China_impacts.pdf (prepared 
for the Stern Review); PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N, CHINA’S 
NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME 17 (2007), available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/ 
P020070604561191006823.pdf. 
 35. A key question in continuing research is the amount and pattern of precipitation in 
China, and its dependence on the climate effects of the Tibetan Plateau.  Richard Tol reports that 
most models show precipitation in China increasing overall with global warming, but one model 
shows precipitation declining—that model is the Chinese Meteorological Office model, which is 
among the best at depicting the Tibetan Plateau, and is likely to be influential with Chinese 
government leaders.  Personal communication From Richard Tol to Author at the EMF meeting in 
Dublin, Ireland (Feb. 22, 2008). 
 36. See A Large Black Cloud, supra note 12; see also THE WORLD BANK & STATE 
ENVTL. PROT. ADMIN., PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, COSTS OF POLLUTION IN CHINA, at xvii 
(2007) (citing a cost of 5.78 percent of GDP); Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Leap Backward?, 
FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2007, at 38, 47 (citing the 400,000 to 750,000 deaths figures and noting that 
Beijing wanted these numbers removed from the World Bank/SEPA report). 
 37. David G. Streets, Black Smoke in China and Its Climate Effects, 4 ASIAN ECON. PAPERS 1 
(2005); Fei Teng & Alun Gu, Climate Change: National and Local Policy Opportunities in China (Fondazione 
Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 74.2007, 2007). 
 38. China’s leaders are no doubt motivated by a variety of factors, among them power (both 
internal and external, reflected in China’s doctrine of “peaceful rise” to great power status), prosper-
ity (economic growth through a market economy), and long-term stability and durability for their 
regime.  See Zheng Bijian, China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great-Power Status, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2005.  
Hexie shehui, “harmonious society,” is the official doctrine of Hu Jintao’s government, adopted in 
October 2006 by the Communist Party of China.  Its focus is on resolving tensions over growth, 
inequality, and pollution.  See Xing Zhigang, Plan Unveiled to Build Harmonious Society, CHINA 
DAILY, Oct. 12, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-10/12/ 
content_706359.htm.  The doctrine 
signaled a shift in the party’s focus from promoting all-out economic growth to solving 
worsening social tensions.  The endorsement, made at a closed-door plenary session held 
by the party’s Central Committee, underlined Hu’s increasing power.  It effectively enshrined 
his doctrine in the same pantheon as those of Mao Zedong and other predecessors.  China’s 
leaders have become concerned in recent years about problems tied to the country’s blister-
ing economic growth.  Anger over a growing gap between rich and poor and an inadequate 
social security system is feared to threaten the party’s stability. . . . The four-day plenary 
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worried about social unrest, water availability (drought in the North, 
flooding in the South), and air pollution.  The Chinese leadership may plau-
sibly fear that health and pollution problems amidst rising expectations may 
yield unrest.  Hu Jintao’s “harmonious society” reforms are premised on his 
assumption that the cost of major reforms is lower than the cost of timid 
reforms.39  In February 2008, the leadership reorganized the Chinese 
government into five “superministries,” one of which is devoted to the 
environment.40  China has set targets for greater energy efficiency and for 
reducing pollution. 
Third, China is especially concerned about the distribution of climate 
impacts across the country, and about their influence on political stability, 
not only about the aggregate bottom line.  In every country, national net 
benefits are not monolithic, but interact with domestic political institutions 
and structures, which may help account for national action.  Within China, 
the stunning rate of economic growth has brought with it widening income 
inequality and a huge wave of internal migration, with some 300 to 400 
million people trying to move from rural areas to cities.41  Changes in the 
distribution of precipitation, storms, droughts and flooding, and sea level rise 
along the coasts, could pose severe strains on Chinese society, which are not 
fully reflected in aggregate studies of agricultural and industrial output.  
Climate change could exacerbate these tensions, such as by worsening the 
                                                                                                                            
session, which ended Wednesday, was the first in 25 years to focus on social issues rather 
than on economic or political development. . . . Experts said this year’s plenary session was 
especially significant because initiatives in areas such as health, education and social 
welfare were more dramatic and comprehensive than usual.  The session also focused on 
rural unrest and the environment. 
Maureen Fan, China’s Party Leadership Declares New Priority: “Harmonious Society”: Doctrine 
Proposed by President Hu Formally Endorsed, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006, at A18, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR2006101101610.html. 
Hu’s proposal for “harmonious society” included environmental protection as a key element.  See 
Building Harmonious Society Crucial for China’s Progress: Hu, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, June 27, 2005, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/27/eng20050627_192495.html.  Two years on, the exact 
meaning of the doctrine remains unclear; at the least, though, it encompasses greater openness to 
public participation, often about environmental issues.  The protests over the Xiamen chemical 
plant in 2007 are illustrative.  See Howard French, Letter From China: A “Harmonious Society” 
Hearing Different Notes, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/04/ 
asia/letter.php.  The core motivation for undertaking reforms now is to avoid more costly dislocations 
later.  See WING THYE WOO, A HARMONIOUS SOCIALIST SOCIETY OR BUST: CHINA’S QUEST FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/ 
2006/1201globaleconomics_woo/20061206woo.pdf. 
 39. WOO, supra note 38, at 7 (“The . . . Hu-Wen leadership . . . has concluded that far-reaching 
reforms are less dangerous than partial reforms.”). 
 40. See Jim Yardley, China Retools Its Government in Efficiency Push, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2008, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/world/asia/12china.html. 
 41. See Economy, supra note 36. 
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scarcity of clean water in urban areas where millions of poor migrants are 
arriving to seek economic opportunity. 
China’s leaders are especially concerned about the impact of cli-
mate and environmental change on political stability.  As Elizabeth 
Economy writes: 
In the view of China’s leaders . . . damage to the environment itself is 
a secondary problem.  Of greater concern to them are its indirect 
effects: the threat it poses to the continuation of the Chinese eco-
nomic miracle and to public health, social stability, and the country’s 
international reputation.  Taken together, these challenges could 
undermine the authority of the Communist Party. . . . The Chinese 
leadership’s greatest fear [is], namely, that its failure to protect the 
environment may someday serve as the catalyst for broad-based demands 
for political change.42 
Prior major environmental lawmaking in China has often occurred in 
the wake of this kind of threat to political stability,43 and climate change 
policy could well be the next example.44  Over a longer time span, there is 
intriguing evidence in Chinese history of climate change sparking warfare 
and dynastic change.45  Present-day Chinese leaders might rationally worry 
that the harms from drought, flooding, agricultural losses and shifts, 
coastal inundation, and storms might also prove to be destabilizing in Chinese 
politics today. 
Historically, an important factor in domestic politics and stability in 
China has been the role of environmental crises in political protest.  A 
longstanding traditional popular belief in China holds that extreme weather 
events or natural disasters are a signal of impending political upheaval.  As 
advanced by the ancient philosopher Dong Zhongshu, in this set of beliefs, 
                                                                                                                            
 42. Id.  Elizabeth Economy notes that in 2006, the Chinese government reported 1,000 
environmental protests per week, and in May 2007 there were major protests involving 7,000 to 
20,000 marchers against a proposed petrochemical facility in Xiamen.  Id.; see also A Large Black 
Cloud, supra note 12 (detailing protests over pollution and land expropriation). 
 43. See Alford & Liebman, supra note 32, at 748 (“It was only when the central leadership 
began to appreciate the extent to which environmental problems might be destabilizing and to 
mount vigorous national campaigns to foster environmental awareness that the ENRPC was able 
to push through strong air pollution legislation.”). 
 44. This scenario might seem like the kind of cultural transformation that yields new laws, as 
discussed above in Part II.  But here the portended protests would arise from domestic responses to 
environmental hazards in China, not from external exhortations to adopt a new cultural or moral 
outlook.  To be sure, though, the two may be connected.  For example, both influences would be at 
play via internet communications among NGOs. 
 45. Gergana Yancheva et al., Influence of the Intertropical Convergence Zone on the East Asian 
Monsoon, 445 NATURE 74, 76 (2007); David D. Zhang et al., Climate Change and War Frequency in 
Eastern China Over the Last Millennium, 35 HUM. ECOLOGY 403 (2007). 
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called Tian Ren Gan Ying (the interaction of heaven and man), a Tian You 
Yi Xiang (weird phenomenon in the sky) can herald a legal or political 
crisis.46  As politics have liberalized somewhat in recent years, these kinds 
of views may have become more prevalent, or at least openly acknowl-
edged, among the Chinese public, even as modernization may have reduced 
the intensity of these beliefs.  One recent example is public mention of 
the Tangshan earthquake that killed 250,000 people just before Mao Zedong 
died in 1976.47  During the Lunar New Year in February 2008, strong 
snowstorms blocked railroad transportation, stranding millions of passengers 
trying to head home from cities to rural areas for the holiday.  Prime Minister 
Wen Jiabao personally appeared at a train station to apologize for the 
government’s failure to handle the problem—evidently the first such personal 
apology in two decades.48  Assuming that Chinese leaders know that storms 
or earthquakes are not mystical causes of political events, they could still 
rationally fear that the public might use a major climate change disaster as a 
rallying point for a populist uprising (based in part on public outrage over 
pollution, but also on other factors) to challenge the governing regime.  This 
is not altogether unlike cultural beliefs and availability cascades that 
sometimes drive lawmaking and even changes in government leadership in 
Western societies.49 
These traditional views coincide with the recent rise of environmental 
groups and litigation in China.  Although far more limited than in the 
                                                                                                                            
 46. I am grateful to Jonathan Ocko and Xin Dai for explanation of this belief system.  I recognize 
that one must be cautious in attempting to interpret cultural traditions in another society (or even 
one’s own).  Evidently Tian Ren Gan Ying was originally a mixture of orthodox Confucianism 
(roughly before 200 B.C.), Taoism, and Yin-Yang theory but later evolved as one of the core theories 
of the revised Confucianism (since 200 B.C.) that was part of imperial China’s governing ideology 
and to an extent remains a popular world view today.  Its “mandate from heaven” and “correspondence” 
theory implies that how the governing class do their work will have reflections in the climate and 
other natural conditions; a natural disaster or extreme weather indicates that the emperor has done 
something wrong.  An abrupt calamity could mean that his rule is coming to its end.  On the philosophy 
of Dong Zhongshu (aka Tung Chung-shu), see Tung Chung-shu, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/eb/print?articleId=73768&fullArticle=true&tocId=9073768 (last visited 
May 10, 2008), and SARAH A. QUEEN, FROM CHRONICLE TO CANON: THE HERMENEUTICS OF THE 
SPRING AND AUTUMN, ACCORDING TO TUNG CHUNG-SHU (1996). 
 47. Personal communication from Jonathan Ocko, Chair, History Department, North Carolina 
State Univ., to author (Jan. 2008) (email on file with author). 
 48. China’s Weather: Frozen Assets, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2008, at 44; Snowbound China: 
Megaphone Apology, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2008, at 12.  The Chinese media blamed climate change for 
the disaster.  See Zhong Guo De Qiang Yu Xue Yu Quan Qiu Nuan Hua You Guan [China’s Storm Is 
Related to Global Warming], ZAOBAO.COM, Jan. 30, 2008, http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/ 
others/pages/snow080130d.shtml. 
 49. See TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1998); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). 
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United States, there is a growing ability of pressure groups to seek legal 
remedies for environmental injury.50  At the same time, Chinese environ-
mental governance has become more decentralized.  Most pollution control 
and enforcement is now in the hands of local officials who often prefer 
industrial growth to pollution control.51  Frustration with local decisions is 
one source of the environmental protests noted above.52 
The tensions within China between urban and rural, rich and poor, wenbao 
and huanbao (a jobs-versus-environment aphorism),53 and explosive economic 
growth (reported at 9 percent per year) offset by costs of pollution (about 6 
percent), all illustrate the deep internal and distributional problems confront-
ing China’s leaders in the environmental arena.  Climate change adds both 
the potential for even more acute distributional tensions, and the risk of spark-
ing political upheaval—all of which are of great concern to China’s leaders. 
Fourth, at the same time that these benefits of climate protection may 
be rising, marginal emissions abatement costs may be declining.  Technologi-
cal change is improving the availability of effective options such as carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) methods.54  Such technological innovation has in 
                                                                                                                            
 50. Bryan Tilt, The Political Ecology of Pollution Enforcement in China: A Case From Sichuan’s 
Rural Industrial Sector, 192 CHINA Q. 915 (2007). 
 51. See Stefanie Beyer, Environmental Law and Policy in the People’s Republic of China, 5 CHINESE J. 
INT’L L. 185 (2006) (arguing that China now has a comprehensive set of environmental laws, but imple-
mentation is impeded by decentralization of power and weak local enforcement); Economy, supra note 36 
(detailing local officials’ incentives to disfavor environmental protection).  Stephanie Beyer notes that 
[T]he inherent problem of China’s environmental legal system is the wide discretion local 
agencies have in addressing environmental issues.  In fact, local governments have gained 
considerable administrative and fiscal autonomy from the central government.  While achiev-
ing more autonomy, local governments have to cope more and more with hard budgetary 
restrictions.  They are responsible for generating most of their own revenue and balancing 
their own budget.  Such a system generates considerable pressure at the local level to 
compete in attracting and promoting economy-building companies.  Local governments very 
often sponsor or own industries themselves and consider environmental regulations to be 
incompatible with economic growth.  Since environmental protection bureaus obtain their 
funding from subnational governments of which they are part, the enforcement of environ-
mental policies faces significant financial constraints and is frequently undermined by 
economic pressure.  Although the State Environmental Protection Agency has formal 
authority over lower-level agencies, this national agency does not have much leverage in ensur-
ing that national regulations and standards are strictly enforced at the local level.  Besides, 
numerous national pollution standards are so lenient that they hardly have an effect. 
Beyer, supra, at 209–10. 
 52. See Economy, supra note 36; Tilt, supra note 50. 
 53. Wenbao is the “warm and full” feeling of prosperity; huanbao is “environmental protection.”  
See Tilt, supra note 50, at 932. 
 54. On March 10, 2008, IEA Executive Director Nobuo Tanaka said carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) would soon be down to $50 per ton.  See Int’l Energy Agency, In the Press, http://www.iea.org/ 
journalists/headlines.asp (last visited May 10, 2008).  Affordable CCS is crucial to reducing CO2 
emissions from China’s vast coal-fired electricity sector. 
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the past mainly occurred in the United States and Europe, as well as Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan, but could soon become more active in China.55  And 
emissions abatement costs may also fall due to institutional innovation, 
such as the use of market-based incentive instruments like emissions trading.  
Following the development and application of these incentive instruments 
in the United States, China is now adopting such policies as well.56 
Fifth, the net benefits to a country from climate change policy or join-
ing a treaty regime are not limited to the physical impacts occurring within 
the country’s territory.  Even if China would suffer only modest losses from 
climate change domestically (as earlier studies had suggested), it would also 
be affected by losses incurred among its allies and trading partners.  China’s 
peaceful rise to great power status and hence its greater economic and politi-
cal interdependence with other countries makes those external relations 
impacts all the more salient.  In an interconnected global community, 
national net benefits include benefits from the avoided damages outside the 
country’s own territory.57  This is true especially for large countries.  In par-
ticular, flooding and coastal dislocations in South Asia could pose problems 
in the future for China in the form of refugee migrations, lost commerce, and 
even national security.58  And if India and Africa suffer serious losses from 
climate change,59 then China, the world’s largest emitter and a leader of the 
G-77 group of developing countries, might prefer to avoid blame from 
its G-77 allies. 
As China rises to become a great power, its leaders may envision their 
role involving greater global responsibility.60  This outlook can be understood 
                                                                                                                            
 55. See Shulin Gu & Bengt Åke-Lundvall, China’s Innovation System and the Move Toward 
Harmonious Growth and Endogenous Innovation, 8 INNOVATION: MGMT., POL’Y & PRAC. 1 (2006), 
available at http://www.innovation-enterprise.com/8.1/8.1.1.html. 
 56. See EMBASSY BEIJING, CHINA’S EMISSIONS TRADING PILOT PROJECTS (2003), available 
at http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/ptr/Emissions-Trading-prt.htm; Emissions Trading Fights 
Pollution, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 30, 2004, at 5, available at http://daxinganling.china.com.cn/english/ 
environment/108505.htm (describing efforts of Dan Dudek of Environmental Defense); Richard 
Morgenstern et al., Demonstrating Emissions Trading in Taiyuan, China, RESOURCES, Summer 2002, at 7. 
 57. Douglas Kysar & Ya-Wei Li, Regulating From Nowhere: Domestic Environmental Law and the 
Nation-State Subject, (Cornell Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-011, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=995301.  Kysar and Li are right to emphasize accounting for the external 
international impacts of national decisions, but wrong to say that benefit-cost analysis cannot do so. 
 58. The same point has been made in a report to the U.S. Department of Defense on climate 
and national security risks.  See PETER SCHWARTZ & DOUG RANDALL, AN ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCENARIO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY 13, 17–19 (2003). 
 59. See Sunstein, supra note 4. 
 60. See generally JOSEPH QUINLAN, THE RISE OF CHINA: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE 
IMPLICATIONS ON TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP (2006); Robert Kagan, End of Dreams, Return 
of History, POL’Y REV., Aug. & Sept. 2007, available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/ 
policyreview/8552512.html; FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD (2008). 
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as part of a realist national interest in fostering interdependencies and recip-
rocities that will ultimately benefit China.  The experience of the 1997–1998 
Asian financial crisis and China’s role in pulling other Asian countries out of 
their downward spiral suggest that China might undertake some economic 
sacrifice to build its role as a world leader and as a player in international 
economic regimes.61  More recently, China’s agreement on the phaseout of 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) in September 2007, its cooperation with 
the United States on the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Climate Change 
and Development and climate-friendly technology,62 and its agreement to 
“measurable, verifiable and reportable” emissions reductions in the Bali Action 
Plan,63 provide continuing evidence of its growing interest in taking a 
leadership role on global environmental issues. 
Sixth, the design of the international regime itself can affect national 
net benefits.  National net benefits are not static or determined in isolation, 
but instead depend on the cooperative deal reached with other countries.  
The structure of the international regime and the incentives it offers to each 
country will thus figure prominently in an assessment of national net bene-
fits.  Successful regimes offer more attractive bases for collective cooperation 
than simply the national net benefits taken separately.  If climate change 
prevention yields global net benefits, the design of the international climate 
regime can distribute that net surplus in a way that changes the payoffs for 
the United States and China and, at least in principle, engages them in 
action.  A variety of side payments can offer a more attractive basis for 
collective cooperation and achieve results through realist persuasion.64 
One leading design for such an international regime is an agreement 
among the dozen or so major emitting countries—the United States, China, 
Europe, Russia, Japan, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Australia, Canada, Mexico, 
Korea, South Africa, and perhaps a few other major countries—in a regime 
                                                                                                                            
 61. See Avery Goldstein, The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging 
Choice, 168 CHINA Q. 835, 845 (2001). 
 62. See ZhongXiang Zhang, China, the United States and Technology Cooperation on Climate 
Control, 10 ENVT’L SCI. & POL’Y 622, 624–25 (2007). 
 63. Bali Action Plan, supra note 2, at 3.  At the same time, China’s leaders do not want to incur 
heavy costs by agreeing to burdensome emissions limits, or to lose face by failing to attain such targets. 
 64. Effective side payments might take a variety of forms, including cash (as in the Montreal 
Protocol Fund to engage China and India), headroom tradable allowances (as in the U.S. acid rain 
trading program to engage Midwestern states, or the Kyoto Protocol to engage Russia), see Wiener, 
supra note 6, or linkage to other issues, such as trade, energy demand, currency holdings in 
investments, IP rights, relations over Taiwan and North Korea, or terrorism.  There is always some 
cost associated with making side payments; headroom allowances in an emissions trading system can 
be the least inefficient mode.  See id. 
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to limit global GHG emissions.65  This regime could be implemented either 
as part of the post-2012 Kyoto Protocol, or as a parallel regime in a plurilat-
eral approach, and could use international emissions trading (cap-and-
trade) and a comprehensive multi-gas, -sector, -source and -sink design.66  The 
allocation of some extra allowances to developing countries would ensure 
them the positive net benefits needed to make participation attractive (i.e., 
to confer positive national net benefits).67  This global-scale approach 
should be sought during 2009, the year the Bali Action Plan calls for a new 
post-Kyoto regime to be formulated, with “measurable, reportable and 
verifiable”68 mitigation commitments by all countries.  Even though China 
has so far declined to participate in such a regime,69 it may be moving 
toward doing so—as long as the United States does the same—as evidenced 
by China’s agreement to the Bali Action Plan.70 
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The past four decades teach that enlightened pragmatism, not orthodox 
moralism, is the best guide for environmental law.  Enlightened pragmatism 
surely has a moral basis.  The issue here is whether an overt appeal to moral 
obligation, or to incentives, would be more effective in moving China and 
the U.S. to successful action on climate change.  I argue here that realist 
geopolitical persuasion among powerful states could be more effective and 
timely in shaping global climate policy than appeal to moral obligation.  In 
particular, the evolving forecasts of the impact of climate change on China, 
domestic concerns about public health and political upheaval due to 
environmental hazards, and the growing recognition that China’s emissions 
threaten its own allies, may influence China’s leaders to adapt its global 
leadership accordingly.  Moreover, the rise of China as a new great power 
in the changing world order may shift its strategic role toward greater 
collaboration and reciprocity.  Of course, this assumes that other countries, 
chiefly the United States, act as well.  And the particular design of the 
international regime itself, such as a global cap-and-trade system with 
headroom allowances for developing countries, can make participation more 
attractive.  This new geopolitical posture may offer an opportunity for 
the United States and China to lead in partnership on forestalling global 
climate change. 
Rational individual decisions in an open-access commons can lead to 
ruin.  But institutions can and often do adapt in time, adjusting incentives 
and staving off the tragedy of the commons.  Climate policy may yet rise to 
this challenge.  Perceived net benefits and geopolitical roles are changing.  
Pragmatic, proactive national leaders in both the United States and China 
need to anticipate the potential preferences of their constituencies, and 
engage in realist persuasion to move the United States and China to adopt a 
cooperative regime before the tragedy of the global commons goes too far. 
Constructing a truly effective global climate regime will be a strategic 
question of relations among the great powers.  Anticipating a coming era of 
a multipolar world order, the year 2009 may resemble 1815, the year that 
Prince von Metternich71 designed the regime to keep peace among the great 
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powers of Europe for almost a century.  Engaging China, the United States, 
and other major countries in an effective global climate regime for the 
21st century will require side payments or linkage to a host of top-priority 
strategic issues, and no less than a modern Metternich.  Indeed, even more; 
Metternich mediated among elites and autocracies, whereas our modern 
strategist must guide great powers whose domestic politics are often open to 
mass public movements and the vicissitudes of pluralist pressures.  Perhaps 
widely shared views will spur action across countries; clearly, the design of 
rules and international regimes will be crucial to shaping national action.  
The global challenge—and opportunity—are great.  While constructivist 
persuasion through moral suasion and cultural transformation may play a 
role, that path may be of limited efficacy, or even counterproductive, in 
engaging the United States and China in a common plan of action.  Chinese 
climate policy is already changing.  The United States too is poised to act.  
Realist incentives in a linked network of global and national policies offer 
the best path ahead. 
